Favor Trading in Public Good Provision

Grassroots fundraising leverages favor trading in social networks to support the provision of a public good. We use a laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of this type of institution. Peer-to-peer reciprocity is important, and having the ability to practice targeted reciprocity in our experiment increases contributions to the public good by 14%. Subjects reward group members who have previously been generous to them and withhold rewards from ungenerous group members. When someone is rendered unable to benefit from favor trading, he gives much less to the public good than he does in other settings. People thus excluded from the “circle of giving” provide a clean and strict test of indirect reciprocity, since they cannot benefit from a norm of cooperation. Contrary to previous studies, we do not observe indirect reciprocity.public goods, reciprocity, experiment, peer-to-peer fundraising

Discrimination in the Warplace: Evidence from a Civil War in Peru

Few events give the opportunity to observe the full range of human behavior as wars do. In the case of civil wars in ethnically-mixed societies, the distribution of violence across various segments of the population can provide evidence on the extent and nature of discrimination. As in the case of markets, identifying discrimination in the warplace is challenging. There is uncertainty on the reconstruction of events as well as the rationale behind the violence. We use a unique data set collected by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission on war crimes during the 1980â??s to show that there is evidence of taste-based discrimination by agents of the state towards ethnic minorities and women. The evidence is robust to different assumptions on the logic of repression and missing data problems.

Discrimination in the Workplace: Evidence from a Civil War in Peru

Few events give the opportunity to observe the full range of human behavior as wars do. In the case of civil wars in ethnically-mixed societies, the distribution of violence across various segments of the population can provide evidence on the extent and nature of discrimination. As in the case of markets, identifying discrimination in the warplace is challenging. There is uncertainty on the reconstruction of events as well as the rationale behind the violence. We use a unique data set collected by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission on war crimes during the 1980's to show that there is evidence of taste-based discrimination by agents of the state towards ethnic minorities and women. The evidence is robust to different assumptions on the logic of repression and missing data problems. Working Paper 07-3

Beauty, Gender and Stereotypes: Evidence from Laboratory Experiments

The existence of a beauty premium in the labor market and the male-female wage gap suggests that appearance can matter in the real world. We explore beauty and gender in a public goods experiment and find similar effects. We find a beauty premium, even though beautiful people contribute, on average, no more or less than others. The beauty premium, however, disappears when we provide information on individual contributions, and becomes a beauty penalty. Players seem to expect beautiful people to be more cooperative. Relative to these expectations, they appear more selfish, which in turn results in less cooperation by others. These appear to be clear examples of stereotyping. We also find a substantial benefit to being male, especially with information. This is primarily due to men being better "leaders." Men tend to make large contributions, and people follow their example and give more in later rounds.

Face Value

There is growing evidence of systematic heterogeneity in behavior by observable characteristics, such as what one would see in a face. We ask, is there informational value in knowing these characteristics in a strategic interaction? Subjects are given the opportunity to purchase a photograph of their partner in the play of a trust game. Not everyone purchases the photo, even at prices as low as $0.20. Senders (first movers in the game) have a more inelastic demand for pictures than responders (second movers). White senders have a substantially higher demand than nonwhite senders or responders. For responders, there is no difference in demand for pictures across ethnicity or sex. White senders who pay to see the picture of their partner use the information to discriminate, sending significantly less to black responders than to white responders. Overall, responders return a higher percentage of the amount received as offers go up, but they do differentiate that percentage when they see the picture of the sender, returning more to a member of the same ethnicity. A face, it appears, has strategic value, especially for those who will use the information to differentiate their decisions.

Use Permits: A Hedonistic Approach Applied to Farmland in the Southeastern US

In the State of Georgia, any agricultural producer who wishes to pump more than 100,000 gallons of water a day for crop irrigation is required to have an irrigation permit. The permit stays with the land and in the event of sale the permit is transferred with the property. Until recently, permits were essentially granted freely to all applicants in the Flint River water basin, without limit. In 1999, however, with increasing demand for water from growing urban Atlanta and several years of drought in the Southeast, the state of Georgia placed a moratorium on the issuance of agricultural water permits in the Flint River basin. This research exploits this policy change within a hedonic pricing framework to estimate the value of irrigation rights in the Southeast US. While the value of irrigation rights has been studied extensively in the western US, differences in property rights and legal regimes, as well as a lack of established water-rights markets in the East, leave us with little information regarding the value of irrigation rights in this setting. Working Paper 06-4

Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments on the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Peru

We present a series of experiments to understand the nature and extent of discrimination in urban Lima, Peru. The experiments exploit varying degrees of information on performance and personal characteristics as people sort into groups to test for statistical versus taste-based discrimination. This allows us to examine the nature of discrimination. Our sample is similar to the racial and socio-economic diversity of young adults in urban Lima. This allows us to look at the extent of discrimination. We use a unique method to measure race, along four racial dimensions common in Peru, and find that race is clearly observable. This gives us confidence that we can examine discrimination based on race. While behavior is not correlated with personal, socio-economic or racial characteristics, people do use personal characteristics to sort themselves into groups. Beauty is a robust predictor of being a desirable group member as is being a woman. Being unattractive or looking indigenous makes one less desirable and looking white increases oneâ??s desirability. Interestingly, indigenous subjects are three times more likely to be classified as unattractive, suggesting that beauty might mask discrimination. We find that once information on performance is provided, almost all evidence of discrimination is eliminated, except in the most-preferred group. The evidence in these cases is consistent with taste-based, rather than statistical, discrimination.

Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining

The ultimatum game has been the primary tool for studying bargaining behavior in recent years. However, not enough information is gathered in the ultimatum game to get a clear picture of respondersâ?? utility functions. We analyze a convex ultimatum game in which respondersâ?? can â??shrinkâ?� an offer as well as to accept or reject it. This allows us to observe enough about respondersâ?? preferences to estimate utility functions. We then successfully use data collected from convex ultimatum games to predict behavior in standard games. Our analysis reveals that rejections can be â??rationalizedâ?� with neo-classical preferences over own- and other-payoff that are convex, nonmonotonic, and regular. These findings present a precise benchmark for models of fairness and bargaining.

On The Preferences of Principals and Agents

One of the reasons why market economies are able to thrive is that they exploit the willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks that laborers might prefer to avoid. Markets work because they remunerate good judgement and punish mistakes. Indeed, modern contract theory is based on the assumption that principals are less risk averse than agents. We investigate if the risk preferences of entrepreneurs are different from those of laborers by implementing experiments with a random sample of the population in a fast-growing, small-manufacturing, economic cluster. As assumed by theory, we find that entrepreneurs are more likely to take risks than hired managers. These results are robust to the inclusion of a series of controls. This lends support to the idea that risk preferences are an important determinant of selection into occupations. Finally, our lotteries are good predictors of financial decisions, thus giving support to the external validity of our risk measures and experimental methods.